Conflict Between Perception, Cognition and Validation as University Students Analyse the Probability of an Event by Baturo, Annette
CONFLICT BETWEEN PERCEPTION, COGNITION AND VALIDATION AS 
YEAR 12 AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ANALYSE  
THE PROBABILITY OF AN EVENT 
Annette R Baturo 
Centre for Mathematics and science Education 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia 
 
Eighteen Year 12 students and 2 cohorts of final-year BEd students (74 students) were shown a “fair” 
(equiprobable outcomes) spinner with three noncontiguous colours and asked whether each of the three 
colours had the same chance of “being spun”.  Half of the Year 12 students either gave unequivocal 
incorrect responses derived from inappropriate considerations of sector size or number of sectors per 
colour, or vacillated between correct and incorrect responses and were unable to make a decision 
(equivocal).  These findings were echoed with the university students although their incorrect responses 
tended to be more unequivocal than equivocal. Validation through trialing (with the university students) 
did not help as the results did not show exactly 1/3 for each colour and, in fact, were interpreted as 
supporting an incorrect response. 
Hawkins and Kapadia (1984) identified four types of probability, namely: (1) theoretical – derived from 
making assumptions of equal likelihood; (2) frequentist – calculated from observed frequencies; (3) 
intuitive – generated from personal belief and perceptions; and (4) formal – calculated precisely from the 
mathematical laws of probability.  Of interest to this study are the latter two which relate to intuitive and 
analytic cognitions (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997).  They defined the intuition cognition as “self evident, 
directly acceptable, holistic, coercive and extrapolative” (p. 96) which was distinguished from the analytic 
cognition by “the feeling of obviousness, of intrinsic certainty” (p. 96).   
Probability ranges from 0 (impossible event) to 1 (certain event) so possible events are represented 
numerically by fractions (part of a whole).  It is well-documented (Behr, Harel, Post, & Lesh, 1992; Nik 
Pa, 1989; Payne, Towsley, & Huinker, 1990) that continuous area models are more conducive to 
facilitating construction of the part/whole notion than discrete set models.  Therefore, when developing the 
part/whole notion of probability, it seems reasonable to begin with spinners (continuous area model in 
which all possible outcomes are visible) than with coins, dice, marbles, tickets, or playing cards (discrete 
set models where all possible outcomes often need to be held in memory). 
The literature is replete with misconceptions in students’ probabilistic thinking (e.g., Fischbein, 1975; 
Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Hawkins & Kapadia, 1984; Jones, Langrall, Thornton, & Mogill, 1999; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Piaget & Inhelder, 1975).  Fischbein and Schnarch’s (1997) study set out to 
determine whether 7 main known misconceptions (e.g., representativeness, negative and positive recency 
effects, compound and simple events) diminished, increased or remained stable across the years (Grades 5, 
7, 9 & 11).  They found that the only stable (and frequent) misconception across the ages was related to 
compound and simple events.  However, the example given refers to the comparison of events in two 
similar sample spaces. Jones et al. (1999) referred to this type of comparison of events as Level 3 whilst 
the probability of an event in one sample space was classified as Level 2.  They found that even after 
persistent instruction, misconceptions at Level 2 remained stable for some Year 3 students.  
Apart from the subjective and experiential beliefs that students invoke when analysing probability tasks, 
one of the major problems related to the teaching/learning of probabilistic notions is the difficulty of 
validating responses because of the large number of trials required.  This can be extremely time-
consuming and the results are not always persuasive for students who have a deterministic view of 
mathematics.  (See Discussion for elaboration of this point.) 
This study explores a very elementary probabilistic notion, namely, the probability of an event in a single 
sample space (Level 2 − Jones et al., 1999) using a spinner (continuous part/whole area model) with Year 
12 students who were individually interviewed on the task to determine the extent of their conceptions 
(including misconceptions).  The study was replicated, to some extent, with university students but was 
extended to include validation of their conceptions.   
Study 1 − Year 12 students 
Background.  Sixteen Year 12 students comprising 8 students from an algebra-based university entrance 
mathematics (designated as UM) and 8 students from a “social” mathematics course that involved no 
algebra (designated as SM) were involved in this study.  Within each of the mathematics categories, there 
were 4 males and 4 females with 2 high- and 2 low-achievers in each gender group.  
This paper reports on one (see Figure 1) of several elementary probability tasks that were undertaken with 
the students in semistructured individual interviews conducted out of school in the student’s home.  The 
tasks incorporated both continuous area models (spinners) and discrete set (marbles) models.   
Figure 1.  Spinner used to determine the robustness of student’s probability notions.   
(“Fair” is used to denote equiprobable outcomes.) 
The spinner used in this study was designed to be provocative, that is, to provoke conflict between 
intuitive and analytic cognitions.  To help students invoke the part-whole fraction notion of probability, a 
simple area model (familiar to Queensland students) was used but was made more difficult because 
students were required to reunitise (Behr et al., 1992; Baturo & Cooper, 1997, 1998, 2000) either:  (1) the 
red and green sectors as two parts, each of which was equal to the yellow part, thus realising the spinner 
was actually partitioned into sixths; or (2) reunitise the two yellow sectors as one sector, thus realising the 
spinner was actually partitioned into thirds.  Therefore, although the spinner had only three colours to 
consider, the noncontiguous nature of the colours increased the difficulty level of the task (Jones, 1974).  
Furthermore, to provoke conflict between intuitive and analytic reasoning, the first question was designed 
to promote analytic reasoning (a consideration of “fairness”− equal chances) whilst the second question 
was designed to promote the intuitive reasoning that is often invoked by games and winning. 
Thus, the task had three main purposes:  (1) To determine the robustness of the students’ analytic 
reasoning in determining the probability of an event; (2) To ascertain whether the students displayed any 
conflict between visual perception/intuitive cognition (the amounts of colour do not look equal) and 
analytic cognition (knowing that if the two yellow parts were adjacent, they would cover the same amount 
of area as each of the other two colours); and (3) To determine whether the student’s dominant form of 
processing was intuitive or analytic. 
Each interview was videotaped then transcribed into protocols for analysis in terms of intuitive or analytic 
cognitions.   
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• Is this a fair spinner? How can you tell?  [Contingent:  Does each colour have 
the same chance of being spun?] 
• If you were playing a game with this spinner, is there a colour that would give 
you a greater chance of winning?  Why?   
Results.  The students either responded with a firm conviction regarding the correctness of their response 
or they vacillated with their answers.  To indicate the conviction or the vacillation, the responses for this 
task were categorised as unequivocal (immediately stated and incontrovertible) or equivocal (ambivalent, 
indeterminate) with correct and incorrect subgroups within each category.  (See Table 1 for the results.) 
Table 1 
Task Results in terms of Equivocation and Correctness of Responses 
 Form of response 
 Unequivocal Equivocal 
Correct Andrea & Michelle (UM/High) 
Ben & Camille (UM/Low) 
Brendan (SM/Low) 
Sarah (SM/High) 
Cognitive processing dominant 
 
Matthew (UM/High) 
John (SM/High) 
 
 
Visual perception strong but not dominant 
Incorrect Karoline (UM/Low) 
Malcolm (UM/Low) 
Nicholas (SM/High) 
Marney & Joe (SM/Low) 
Visual perception dominant 
Eddy (UM/High) 
Jane (SM/High) 
Kerri (SM/Low) 
 
Conflict between types of processing 
Only half of the students gave the correct response (including those 2 in the equivocal correct category). 
Of the two students in the equivocal correct category, Matthew's (UM/H) initial response was negative, 
but his change to a positive response was almost instantaneous, perhaps indicating that, to him, intuitive 
reasoning is still a powerful factor in processing information but not so powerful that it dominates his 
analytic cognitive processing. The other student, John (SM/H), took about 10 seconds before responding 
but his explanation was rather interesting. 
. . . because there's an even amount of each colour; like these two [red and green] have the same odds, 
right, but . . . these two [2 yellow] have got to vary between each of their coordinates [indicating the width 
of each yellow section with the fingers of each hand]; add these [the 2 yellow] both add up and I think 
they would equal the green and the red. 
Of these 8 students who gave correct responses, there was an equal number of the higher-level UM and 
lower-level SM students, an equal number of high and low-performing students, as well as an equal 
number of females and males.  Therefore, this study did not find that course, achievement, or gender 
impacted on the ability to process the probabilistic notion of equally likely outcomes analytically.  
The incorrect responses were based on strategies related either to number of like colour sectors or to sector 
area.  For example, of the five students in the unequivocal incorrect category, Karoline (UM/L), Marney 
and Joe (both SM/L) maintained that yellow had more chance of being spun than either red or green 
because there were two yellow portions and only one red and one green portion.  Nicholas (SM/H) and 
Malcolm (UM/L), however, had no doubts that red or green would have a greater chance of being spun 
than yellow because each of them had a larger area for the needle to land on than yellow. 
The remaining students, those in the equivocal incorrect category (Eddy, Jane, and Kerri), fluctuated 
between intuitive and analytic processing.  Ultimately, though, the intuitive cognition was more dominant 
than the analytic cognition.  Their protocols reveal the conflict invoked by the task. 
Eddy: No, maybe because these two colours [yellow] are right opposite so these two [yellow] would have 
more chances.  But if these two [yellow] joined together are the same as these two colours [red 
and green] then it would be a fair spinner but these two [red and green] would have more 
chances. 
Jane:  I think if you put those two [yellow] together, they'd probably be the same as the others but I 
think that the red and the green are probably more dominant.  Like your object [indicating the 
needle on the spinner] is more likely to land on the red or the green. 
At this stage, Jane's (SM/H) understanding of fair and unfair as they applied to spinners was investigated.  
She was first shown a spinner which was half blue and half orange and asked if this was a fair spinner to 
use in a game.  Jane said that it was because you had the same chance of landing on either colour.  She 
was then shown another spinner which had all equal parts (4 blue, 3 red, 1 green) and all colours were 
contiguous.  Jane said that this was a fair spinner, too.  When asked if she were playing a game and could 
only win if she spun green, she said:  Oh, no, it wouldn't be fair then.  Oh, do you mean to look at the 
colours?  No, not fair [referring to the original spinner in Figure 1] because there's two of them [yellow]. 
Kerri’s responses were indeterminate on all the tasks and were therefore difficult to probe as the following 
protocol reveals. 
Kerri: Um . . . that is not a 50% fair spinner.  It's probably 2 thirds. 
I:  What colour would you prefer to have in a game? 
Kerri: Prefer or most likely? 
I:  Well, if you say that's not a fair spinner, then one colour must have more or less chance of 
occurring. 
Kerri: Well, it'd be the two yellows because they're smaller and there'd be either the red or the green. 
I:  Are you saying that red or green would have more chance than yellow or − ? 
Kerri:  Definitely (interrupting).  Yes. 
Study 2 − BEd students  
Background.  The task in Study 1 was tendered for discussion in a tutorial/workshop with 2 cohorts of 
final-year BEd students (39 and 35 students).  As for the Year 12 students, responses were either correct, 
unequivocally incorrect or equivocally incorrect. (The conflict provoked vociferous and robust arguments 
as each group of students tried to convince the others that their thinking was appropriate.) With respect to 
the incorrect responses, the university students had the same misconceptions as the Year 12 students.  No 
new misconceptions were proffered.   
Validation results.  The spinner (with colours) was shown on an overhead transparency and then a 
transparency copy of the spinner partitioned into sixths but without colour was placed on top (see Figure 
2).  The students were then asked what the probability was of getting red, green or yellow.  For these 
students, the fact that they could see that each colour had 2 sixths (or 1 third) of the area did not offset their 
initial intuitive cognitions regarding the fact that one of the colours was split and therefore red or green had 
a better chance (because of sector size) or yellow had a better chance because there were two parts, albeit 
smaller parts. 
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original spinner transparent overlay
Figure 2.  Attempt 1 to “prove” that all outcomes are equiprobable on the given spinner. 
The students were then shown the spinners in Figure 3 and asked if any of them were “fair”.  All agreed that 
Spinners A and B were fair (A because the colours were contiguous; B because the noncontiguous allocation 
of the colours was “even”) but continued to maintain (or be indecisive) that Spinner C was not. 
Figure 3.  Attempt 2 to “prove” that all outcomes on the original spinner are equiprobable. 
Each class decided that, if this occurred in their teaching career, they would ask their students to undertake 
an experiment with Spinner C.  The BEd students were allocated to 10 groups and each group was 
provided with a model of the spinner.  Each student in the group was asked to spin the needle 10 times and 
to record his or her result for each spin..  Table 2 shows the outcomes of this trial as well as those 
undertaken by a second cohort. 
Table 2 
Results of An Experiment Undertaken by Two Cohorts of BEd Students to Validate Predicted Outcomes 
for Spinner C 
 Outcome 
Results Red Yellow Green 
1st cohort (n = 390) 136 117 137 
2nd cohort  (n = 350) 116 119 115 
Note.  In this table, n refers to the number of trials in the experiment. 
With respect to the first cohort, the students who had thought that the spinner was not fair because red or 
green would be more likely to be spun than yellow felt vindicated by this result.  They believed that the 
results supported their prediction that the spinner was not fair.  With respect to the second cohort, the 
students who thought that the spinner was not fair because yellow, with its two parts, had more chance 
than either red or green also felt that the results vindicated their reasoning.  The first cohort was 
unimpressed by the suggestion that there should have been more trials whilst the second cohort was 
unconvinced that the results were very close to a third of all trials (indicating a deterministic view of 
mathematics).   
Discussion and conclusions 
Cognition.  As both studies showed, misconceptions with respect to the spinner in Figure 1, which had 
only three possible outcomes to consider, were evident in a large percentage of students.  Half of the Year 
12 students and many of the BEd students gave either an incorrect response or vacillated between correct 
and incorrect responses when shown the spinner.  The incorrect responses revealed that students had two 
main misconceptions which were an artefact of the task, namely:  (1) the larger sectors (red and green) had 
more chance because they were “dominant” (Jane); and (2) the two smaller yellow sectors had more 
chance because they gave 2 chances whereas the red and green sectors gave 1 chance only.  The students 
who gave unequivocal incorrect responses appeared to be operating from intuitive cognitions based on 
comparing either the size of the parts or the number of like colours.  That is, they were estimating chances 
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using a part-part ratio schema rather than measuring probability with a part-whole fraction schema 
(Fischbein, 1975). 
This result supported Fischbein and Schnarch’s (1997) study in which they found that the probability of an 
event produced stable and frequent misconceptions across age levels.  It also extended their findings by 
showing that these misconceptions continue into adulthood.  Furthermore, the task used in this paper was 
more simple than the one used by Fischbein and Schnarch because only one sample space had to be 
considered, indicating that the problem is deep-seated.   
Validation.  Validation of reasoning was not successful as the results of the 2nd study showed.  Neither 
encouraging reunitising by overlaying a transparent replica of the spinner showing sixths (see Figure 2) 
nor a consideration of structurally isomorphic spinners (see Figure 3) was sufficient to persuade students 
to focus on the fraction schema embodied in the task (i.e., analytic reasoning).  The university students all 
stated unequivocally that Spinner A and Spinner B (see Figure 3) had equally likely outcomes (red green, 
yellow) but maintained that Spinner C (task spinner) did not.  Spinner A had all contiguous parts whilst 
Spinner B had all noncontiguous parts.  However, Spinner C had some contiguous and some 
noncontiguous parts thereby producing the conflict between equality (2 red, 2 green, 2 yellow), inequality 
through sector size (red and green both larger than either yellow) and inequality through number of sectors 
(1 red, 1 green, 2 yellow).  These inequalities appear to be linked to the part-part notion of ratio rather than 
to the part-whole notion of fraction. 
Validation through experiment was equally unsuccessful for two reasons: (1) the insufficient number of 
trials produced skewed results (see Table 2), thus inadvertently supporting a misconception; and (2) the 
students’ deterministic view of mathematics was so entrenched that they were dissatisfied with any result 
that did not exactly show 1 third of the trials for each colour (as for the 2nd cohort of university students).   
Teaching and learning.  The major implication for teaching and learning is that probability schemata 
must be connected explicitly to fraction schemata through language, exemplars, and symbols.  In this 
study, the students who vacillated between correct and incorrect responses clearly were unsure as to 
whether to trust their perceptual/intuitive processing (comparison/ratio) or their cognitive processing 
(fraction).  Eddy, the top-performing mathematics student in his school was obviously perplexed by his 
inability to decide.  He had a well-developed fraction schema but it seems as though he did not realise the 
validity of this cognition, possibly because his probability learning experiences did not focus on the 
connection between probability and fractions.  As Study 2 showed, this situation is exacerbated by 
problems with validation.  Neither logical argument nor experimentation may convince students of the 
errors in their answers.   
Probability, possibly more than any other mathematical domain, is plagued by a plethora of informal and 
formal language to denote possible events.  A diagram such as that in Figure 4 was found to be useful for 
the BEd students in this study because it provided an organisational framework for plotting the language 
“mathematically”.   
Figure 4.  A continuum of formal and informal language ranging in meaning from impossible to certain 
impossible
possible
0 1
certain
just as/equally likely
equal chance
highly unlikely
not likely
some/less chance
highly likely
greater chance
Teachers need to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of common probability exemplars and should 
be guided in their use by sound pedagogical principles rather than by their real-world appeal.  For 
example, the sequence of probability exemplars should follow the sequence of exemplars used to develop 
the part/whole notion of fractions, that is, continuous area models such as spinners before discrete set 
models such as marbles.  However, spinners can be partitioned in different ways and the outcomes 
(colours, shapes or numbers) can be arranged either contiguously or noncontiguously. If contiguous parts 
only are used, students may inadvertently come to rely on the intuitive and inappropriate comparison/ratio 
schema.  Therefore, provocative tasks such as the one in this paper should be incorporated to provoke 
conflict between intuitive and analytic cognitions to provide insights into the appropriateness of student’s 
thinking. 
In the early stages of learning, the common fraction recording facilitates connection to the fraction 
schemata required for processing probability tasks.  Unlike decimals or percents, common fraction 
symbols indicate the total number of outcomes (denominator) and the number of outcomes under 
consideration (numerator). 
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